	170907congreOA Argument
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2	CONGREGATION RABBINICAL COLLEGE OF TARTIKOV, et al.,
4	Plaintiffs,
5	v. 07 Civ. 6304 (KMK)
6	VILLAGE OF POMONA, et al.,
7	Defendants.
8	White Plains Courthouse White Plains, N.Y. September 7, 2017
9	2:30 p.m.
10	Before:
11	THE HONORABLE KENNETH M. KARAS,
12	District Judge APPEARANCES
13	JOHN G. STEPANOVICH
14	DONNA SOBEL PAUL SAVAD
15	ROMAN STORZER Representing Plaintiffs Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, et al.
16	MARCI HAMILTON
17	JOHN PELOSO THOMAS DONLON
18	Representing Defendants Village of Pomona, et al.
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(914)390-4053

Case 7:07-cv-06304-KMK Document 355 Filed 03/05/18 Page 2 of 94 170907congreOA Argument 1 (In open court) THE DEPUTY CLERK: In the matter of Congregation 2 Rabbinical College of Tartikov versus the Village of Pomona. 3 4 Counsel, please state your appearances for the record. 5 MR. STEPANOVICH: John Stepanovich. 6 MS. SOBEL: Donna Sobel. 7 MR. STORZER: Roman Storzer. 8 MR. SAVAD: Paul Savad. 9 THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all. 10 MS. HAMILTON: Marci Hamilton. 11 MR. PELOSO: John Peloso. 12 MR. DONLON: Thomas Donlon. 1.3 THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all. Please be 14 seated, everybody. 15 We're here for oral argument, closing statements, or 16 how ever you want to phrase it as. I have read the papers. 17 Just so you don't misinterpret, they were largely downloaded on 18 my iPad, so I'm not in touch with my bookie, if you're 19 wondering what I'm doing with my iPad. 20 So, I don't know who is going to speak on behalf of 21 plaintiffs, but I guess it makes sense for you to go first. 2.2. And there's no time limit here or anything like that. 23 MR. STEPANOVICH: Well, I'm assuming, just as you

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said, your Honor, we'd have some give and take.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

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Case 7:07-cv-06304-KMK Document 355 Filed 03/05/18 Page 3 of 94 170907congreOA Argument 1 MR. STEPANOVICH: So, we have a short statement to 2 begin with. 3 THE COURT: Before you do your short statement, do you 4 mind if I have a refreshment? 5 (Laughter) 6 MR. STEPANOVICH: You just had to do it. 7 THE COURT: Brandon and I were talking about it. 8 MR. STEPANOVICH: Is it ginger ale? 9 THE COURT: It's not. We realized there was a purity 10 issue there. Anyway, trying to set the tone here, give or 11 take. 12 So, go ahead with the opening statement, and I do have 1.3 questions. And this is going to be how ever long you think it 14 needs to be. Go ahead. 15 16 MR. STEPANOVICH: Good afternoon, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 18 MR. STEPANOVICH: These public servants for the 19 Village of Pomona believe that they have the power to decide 20 who belongs in Pomona and who does not belong in Pomona. 21

Village of Pomona believe that they have the power to decide who belongs in Pomona and who does not belong in Pomona. Jacob Hershkowitz, Chaim Rosenberg, Meilech Menczer, and the Rabbinical College of Tartikov, they do not belong in Pomona. That's the message that was sent by these public servants of the Village of Pomona when they passed the laws that we challenge in this lawsuit.

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They used their power as the decision-makers of Pomona to rig the system, to keep the plaintiffs - these plaintiffs and those like them - out of their village because they wanted to maintain their diversity and keep Pomona Pomona. They had the power, they knew that, and they used that power to make a conscience decision to take away the freedoms of these plaintiffs. Because they were a threat to the people of Pomona, so these public servants had to stand up to that threat posed by Jacob Hershkowitz, Chaim Rosenberg, Meilech Meczer, and those that look like them, talk like them, worship like them, because they belong to the burgeoning Hasidic community around Ramapo, and they, along with their families, would attend Tartikov's Rabbinical College.

And why do they pose a threat to the people of Pomona? Because they will completely change the make-up of the Village, they will change the character of the Village, they will change the politics of the Village, and they would create a disgusting mini-city in the Village of Pomona.

But these public servants of the Village of Pomona want you to believe them and trust them that they were just doing their job, that we have it all wrong, that we twisted their words and mischaracterized the messages delivered to them by their friends and neighbors.

They say we're not racist, we're not bigots, but the plaintiffs have never used those ugly words. We just laid out

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the evidence that now ends the debate once and for all as to whether or not these laws were passed for any legitimate purpose. These public servants of the Village of Pomona are the law in Pomona.

When Paul Savad showed up to remind them of RLUIPA, they ignored him. Oh, you mean that fundamentally flawed hammer? We'll fight you if you try to use that against our village. These public servants have the power in Pomona, they have the vision, they have the plan, they have the money, and they have the team to fight, to fight Tartikov so that it does not usurp the Village or the Village Board.

These public servants were elected by the people of Pomona, their friends and neighbors, to make the laws and to enforce the laws. And even though they can't say it in public because their lawyer tells them to be careful what you say in public, they will not cave in.

These public servants were more afraid of their friends and neighbors than a federal judge, because if we succeed, they'll get a pat on the back from the people of Pomona who will tell them, That's okay, you did your job, you served your public, our money was well spent. You held off that natural progression of homogeneous individuals for as long as you could. And they will blame you, your Honor, for doing what they took an oath to do as true public servants, to enforce the law instead ignore it, to uphold the Constitution

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1 instead of trample on it.

If this Court is supposed to trust them and believe them and believe what they said in this courtroom under the spotlight of this federal courtroom, then it will have to disregard what they said and what they did years ago outside of the spotlight of this courtroom.

Be careful what you say in public, Mr. Yagel said.

Mr. Marshall, who tells the citizens of the January '07 meeting to give him the benefit of the doubt;
Mr. Marshall, before that meeting, as he tells his colleagues,
Watch out, the meeting will probably be videotaped and
privately transcribed by Savad and Company.

Rita Louie says, I'd like to form an offshoot of Preserve Ramapo, but I can't do it because of my position.

And why didn't Rita Louie or Brett Yagel sign their name to the letter that claimed that the influx of homogeneous individuals into Pomona was not a natural progression? Why if they had nothing to hide?

If these public servants had nothing to hide, then why did they meet behind closed doors ten times to discuss

Tartikov, and, during that time, introduce Local Law No. 1 of

2007 and Local Law No. 5 of 2007?

The silence to that evidence is deafening. They have no answer, they have no response. That alone proves that these public servants had something to hide.

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So, we're supposed to trust Rita Louie. We know about Rita Louie and her adverse inference. We are supposed to trust Brett Yagel, Nick Sanderson, and Rita Louie again, but during their campaign, they all admitted that they told the voters that Tartikov would have environmental and safety issues when they had no information.

Let's trust Brett Yagel, who, when the Facebook post was discovered, did he turn it over to his lawyers? No. Did he preserve the evidence? No. What did he do? He chastised Rita Louie for making a lapse in judgment. He was more worried about Tartikov's lawyers discovering the evidence and your Honor than he was about doing the right thing.

The evidence is gone. The text exchange is gone. His post is gone. Where could it have gone? Where is it? Nobody knows. But one thing we do know is that Mayor Yagel in those texts told Rita Louie, We don't want to lose this case. And we know that because he said so himself in those texts away from the spotlight of this courtroom.

So, the evidence is in. Your Honor has heard it. But in order to defend themselves, these public servants want you to trust them and believe them.

They're not worthy of that trust. They're not worthy of the benefit of the doubt that Mr. Marshall asked for at the January 22, 2007 meeting. They haven't earned it.

If we look -- your Honor, I have a few boards. Do you

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    mind?
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              THE COURT: Absolutely. Help yourself. Whatever you
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     want to do.
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: Should I mark these? They're
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     demonstratives.
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              THE COURT: They're demonstratives, so it's up to you
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     in terms of what you want the record on appeal to be.
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: Well, it's okay. I'd like to mark
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     them.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. STEPANOVICH: I'm trying to make sure that
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    everybody can see.
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              MR. PELOSO: I'm going to object. First of all, we
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    haven't seen them. I don't know to what extent they're hearsay
     or they're not hearsay. Obviously, they're not evidence.
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              THE COURT: Yes. They're demonstratives.
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: And I don't know -- for purposes of
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     this hearing, I don't know where we left off on exhibit
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    numbers.
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              Do you want me to just choose a number?
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              MR. PELOSO: Well, it's not a trial exhibit.
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: Yes. I'm not going to admit them.
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              THE COURT: Yes, that's why I'm not sure you need to
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    mark them.
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: Okay.
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1 THE COURT: If you want to mark them, you can give 2 them a whole new series of --3 MR. STEPANOVICH: Plaintiffs' A. Does that work? 4 THE COURT: Done. 5 MR. PELOSO: We would object. In the event of an 6 appeal, these are not exhibits. 7 THE COURT: They're not exhibits. They're not being 8 taken as exhibits, they're not being received as exhibits, not 9 being offered as exhibits. It's a closing statement 10 demonstrative display. 11 MR. STEPANOVICH: Thank you. 12 As I was saying, your Honor, they want you to trust 1.3 them and believe them, and these are their own words. 14 are words of the public servants of the Village of Pomona. 15 To Deputy Mayor Al Appel: You failed. Sorry. Monsey 16 grew up under your watch. 17 Herb Marshall, 2/22/09: This thing's going to come 18 They're going to come in and we're going to be caught with in. 19 our pants down if we don't move. That's why I want to make 20 sure that we're moving ahead. 21 Herbert Marshall, 12/18/2000: Zero population growth 2.2. is critical. Zero population growth should be a major plan 23 objective for Ramapo, a town that, beginning in the 1990s, has attracted a burgeoning Hasidic Jewish community, which, for the 24

most part, settled around the central hub of Monsey.

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Now, zero population growth - I mean, who thinks those things today, let alone says it? Zero population growth. Mr. Marshall had no problem saying that back in 2003. The Tartikov development could completely change the Village and the make-up of the Village. Now, it's not about size, as the defendants want this Court to believe; and, as their representative testified at trial, that most of the statements were statements about size. Could completely change the Village and the make-up of the Village. Not about size. The Village should maintain its cultural and religious diversity - Nicholas Sanderson. Not about size. The prior statement could completely change the Village and the make-up of the Village - Nicholas Sanderson. Commenting on the Village's strong law of governing schools suggested - Nicholas Sanderson - suggested that Yeshiva Spring Valley was advised to go to a friendlier place, such as Ramapo to put up their school - Nicholas Sanderson, 11/4/05. It's not about size. It's pretty disgusting. They're trying to create this mini-city in our Village - Brett Yagel, January '07. Not about size.

In his campaign material - Brett Yagel - maintaining our diversity, as well as the feeling of community is essential. Not about size.

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Regarding an upcoming civic association meeting —
Brett Yagel — must be careful about what we say, don't know who
is in the audience. Who knows? Savad might show up again —
Brett Yagel, April 02, '07. Definitely not about size, but
they are being careful about what they are saying, and
Mr. Yagel is advising everybody else to be careful. If it's
about size, what do they have to hide?

exception to the statement that Pomona's potential residents at Tartikov would be a natural progression. To say that this influx of homogeneous individuals is natural in any way is simply not true - Brett Yagel and Rita Louie, March of '07. That is not about size. That's about the people who were on their way to Pomona and the Orthodox/Hasidic Jews.

These are statements, your Honor, the words of Village residents and former officials. Robert Prol, Village resident, who was then appointed to the Village Planning Board, referred to Tartikov's proposed residents as non-taxpayers; stated that Tartikov would be a slum; posted on a blog about Tartikov, "You seem to forget that the Constitution was written for all of us, not just money-grubbing anti-goyim Semites."

He repeatedly referred to the Babad family and Chaim Babad as BaBAD, even though he never met any of the Babad family members; referred to Babad and his ilk; recommended a book to his defeat RLUIPA followers for communities under

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attack from Hasidic blocs. And I think Mr. Prol explained, or tried to explain, Oh, that's only about density, overdevelopment. Your Honor will be the judge of that.

Melvin Cook, Village resident and former chairman of the planning board referred to New Square, the area occupied by Orthodox/Hasidic Jewish people as a tribal ghetto and stated that he is opposed to an area becoming a tribal ghetto. He was opposed to Tartikov and stated that some of us see the Rabbinical college as the beginnings of another restricted religious community similar to New Square. Because the religious people as we know in New Square are undereducated in a sense because they study the Talmud, so they don't earn as much money, but they have large families, which means a high percentage are on public assistance. You'll see Medicaid costs skyrocket in communities like New Square and Kiryas Joel.

Those are the facts according to Mr. Cook.

Rockland County and Ramapo have become less diverse because there are more Orthodox, ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic Jews living there and less non-Orthodox Jews, less secular Jews and less non-Jews. It's hurt the community.

Leslie Sanderson, Pomona Village Clerk and Village
Administrative Assistant and wife of former Mayor Nicholas
Sanderson: She opposed the sale of the property to the
Orthodox for a middle school by saying, That does not sound
good and we must all go to the public hearings when they

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announce them. The Village objected to the Yeshiva development. And, finally, she says, Tartikov will usurp the Village, perhaps the Village Board.

These are comments, your Honor, some of the comments at the January 22, 2007 meeting, where the defendants argue that those comments were about the size and scale of Tartikov's project.

Your Honor heard the video and I'm sure has seen it again, and I beg your indulgence for a few more highlights of the statements that were made at that meeting.

And we highlight these because we believe the evidence proves that the statements were about the future beneficiaries of that property and not about the size, and not about the scale of the project that these defendants, these public servants of Pomona, want this Court to believe.

"We're going to be another Kiryas Joel, a Hasidic community. That's why we're emotional. You can get into all that environmental impact and all of that, that's all I have to say. It would be nice to hear you all saying, 'Hey, I know how you feel.'"

And Mayor Marshall accommodated her. "Ladies and gentlemen, there isn't anyone sitting up here who doesn't know how you feel," but he could say only what he could say because the mayor and the Board members, the public servants of Pomona, were advised to be careful what they said in public.

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"I'm a resident of Pomona. This is a disgrace. an absolutely disgrace. You're in the wrong town and the wrong Village." About size? About scale? I don't think so. "Tartikov would entirely change the character of the Village, it would entirely change the politics of the Village. And I think there has to be a solution through the zoning laws and through the amendments to the zoning laws that prohibits such a large number of people being within one property and one institution." And that night, the public servants of Pomona accommodated that request, and they came up with a solution by passing one of the laws challenged in this lawsuit. "I don't look forward to having an increased tax base. I don't look forward to having blights on the landscape and a change in the nature of the community." Size? I don't think so. Scale? I don't think that statement's about scale. "There's no denying what is going on here tonight, and what's going on here tonight is that there is a group who wants to take over this Village, and we live in this Village and we're saying to you, Where are our rights?" About size? About scale? I don't think so. Final comments, your Honor, of the January 22, 2007

Final comments, your Honor, of the January 22, 2007 meeting that these defendants argue were about size and scale:
"Why should I be responsible for paying the expenses of somebody else's lifestyle?" Not about size, not about scale.

"These changes are making it very easy for these

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people to move here, very easy. How are you going to help us make sure that doesn't happen?" The response to the people of Pomona by their public servants was passing the laws that are challenged in this lawsuit.

"I'm pretty sure that I read in the paper that it said rabbinical students and their families. That is my concern."

About size, scale? I don't think so.

"The frustration that we have is that you knew of the press that had come out, petition whether it be true or not, you knew that it was out there, and you know how we were very, very upset. I think what would have helped us if, at the beginning of this meeting, you had said, 'This is what's going on. We know that you've read this, we're here to protect your interests.'"

Mayor Marshall responds saying what he can say in public, because he's been advised by their counsel to be careful what you say in public, he responds, "Ladies and gentlemen, let me say something. We, sitting at this table, have limitations that are placed on us as to what we can say and what we can't say, because our attorney tells us what we can say and what we can't say. I can't say what I feel. I can't. If I agree with you, I don't agree with you. I don't have that luxury of being able to say all that here. All that I can say is that every member of this Board works very, very hard to do what is best for this community. You have your

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issues. Don't assume because no one has gotten up and said,
'Wow, I agree with you. Oh, boy. Don't assume that because we
didn't do that, we don't agree.' We may or we may not, but
please give us the benefit of the doubt."

They don't deserve the benefit of the doubt, these public servants of Pomona, your Honor. It is absolutely crystal clear that the Village of Pomona public servants, these defendants, responded to their community, and not only did they respond to the demands of the community, most of them led the fight. They were out front.

And so, your Honor, the point is, was the discrimination, was the animus against the Orthodox/Hasidic Jews a significant factor in the passage of these laws. Your Honor, I think the evidence is clear there can be no dispute. The evidence is crystal clear, especially in light of the mountains of evidence that we have on that, and in light of the telegraphing of these public servants of Pomona, "Don't worry, we've got your back, we hear you, we've heard you, and we hear you loud and clear."

And so, your Honor, I conclude simply by saying that when they came into this courtroom, when these public servants came into this courtroom and they said our claims are repugnant, how dare you accuse us of discrimination, they sat under the spotlight of this federal courtroom and claimed their innocence, but what they said in this courtroom doesn't jive

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with what they said and what they did years ago outside of the 1 2 spotlight of this courtroom, and they're not entitled to the 3 benefit of the doubt. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 Ms. Hamilton. 6 MS. HAMILTON: Good afternoon. 7 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 8 MS. HAMILTON: I didn't bring any props, so I'll just 9 stick with what I've got in front of me. 10 THE COURT: Fair enough. 11 MS. HAMILTON: So, I think we ought to go back to what 12 this case is actually about. There's been an attempt, both in 1.3 the Plaintiffs' post-trial brief and now with our dramatic 14 reading of certain lines uttered by other people, that there's some kind of cloud, there's some kind of cloud of 15 16 discrimination, but, of course, that's not how cases work. 17 It's not a cloud that matters; what matters is the facts. 18 So, what I thought I would do is to go through the 19 facts that were proved beyond a preponderance, which is, of 20 course, the standard, and just to set the stage for that, let's 21 remember we're in a facial challenge. This is the largest 2.2. non-application land-use project I've ever seen in an RLUIPA 23 case - it's 130 acres and refusal to apply for anything,

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the dorms or it's a text amendment or it's a zone change.

whether it's a use variance for the 20-percent requirement for

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There was no discrimination proven at trial, there's no substantial burden, and there is certainly no exclusion.

In answer to the question Mr. Stepanovich posed, what did they have to hide from Mayor Marshall, who, after all, is Jewish, what he had to hide is that he's not allowed to pre-decide an application before it's been submitted.

There was an assumption of good-faith dealing by

Tartikov that it would be applying for something. I don't know how many communities I've said, You may not judge this before anything is on paper, and that's exactly what was being said, and that's exactly what is in the trial transcript. I don't think ten lines out of 1,310 pages of a trial read by a lawyer on the other side is going to give us the full flavor of what was actually said in those pages.

So, what are the facts that have been proved beyond a preponderance in this case? The main fact, I think, is that the plaintiffs seek to create a rabbinical college extraordinaire. This is a one-of-a-kind item. It is so unusual, that it is impossible, at least so far, to find any way to get it accredited. It is so unusual, that it is extremely difficult to get anybody to sign up to be a student for it. It's so unusual that it is requiring people to do things - that we have in the record repeatedly - nobody has accomplished in 30 years.

I hope they build it. I hope that they can achieve

Argument

what is a dream of Chaim Babad. This is his dream. This rabbinical college extraordinaire is, according to the trial transcript, it's a dream, it's a vision, it's a hypothetical. It's a conceptual plan, and, at its most concrete, it's a pre-proposal plan. It is this extraordinary rabbinical college that has never been described in terms of land-use.

What do we know about this rabbinical college? Well, we know a couple of things for sure. We know that they want to study four books that go beyond the ordinary training for a beit din judge. That's what we know. We know that it's going to take a very long time, 15 years minimum. And we know from the facts by a preponderance that the likely enrollment will be extremely small. According to Chaim Babad, he tried. Out of 140 students, he was only able to persuade 10. And why does he say that he was only able to do that? Because it is so hard. This is such a hard path. It is extremely difficult. In ten years, they were able to find ten students, and these are students who are being paid, they are receiving a stipend, and they can only gin up ten students.

This actually reminds me of a case at the Supreme Court where Americans United was arguing that parochial schools should not get computers, because computers could be used to divert toward religious purposes, and that would be a clear violation. This is Mitchell v. Helms. So, they get to trial, and they get up to the Supreme Court, and there has not been an

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ounce of evidence of diversion. And, in the end, what the judges say is you've over ten years to produce some kind of evidence of what you're talking about, and they hadn't produced it. So, the Court in *Mitchell v. Helms* said that they were not going to assume diversion. They had ten years here, since 2007, to recruit, to find students, to be able to point to students who were interested, and what the record shows is they found ten.

What other facts do we know? We know that Tartikov and its affiliate own 130 acres, 14 homes, and, so far, 10 families who would use 14 homes and 130 acres.

What else do we know? And this is the critical part of the RLUIPA claim and the free exercise claim: We know for a fact that there is no religious belief in this faith that requires that they live in multi-family housing, or that they live in a dorm, or that forbids them from living in a single-family home. Both Mr. Tauber said that on 128, Mr. Rosenberg said it on 183, but he said it even more strongly. He said the type of home that you live in at this kind of a college is irrelevant.

So, if you take that out of the case, it doesn't matter whether they live in the single-family homes they already own, or a dorm, or multi-family. They still accomplish their religious ends. That basically takes the legs out from under their case, and that's just testimony at trial.

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Now, what they do believe in, clearly, is they believe in sectarian courts for disputes between fellow Jews. They say they need judges. You can spend a lot of time going through this trial transcript; you will never find a fact about how many judges exist, how many cases are not being heard, how long are people waiting to have cases heard. Those statistics are out there, but they weren't introduced in this case. All that was introduced in this case was an opinion that there aren't enough judges, and because there aren't enough judges, Chaim Babad's dream should be permitted to go forward without application of any sort.

We also know beyond a preponderance that the local government and the community are quite united. They clearly oppose overdevelopment. They oppose K-Mart, then they oppose Wal-Mart, they oppose multi-family housing. They accepted group homes in the end, found that that was just fine. They favor single-family housing in an area where there's multi-family housing aplenty.

And one of the most remarkable parts of this case is that the frequent reference by members of this community valuing diversity is supposedly to be interpreted as a belief in discrimination. That is putting the opposite meeting to the words that are being provided. I hope in this day and age that everybody values diversity. This community certainly does.

So, if you're going to look at the record, you're

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going to look at it neutrally, there is evidence of an intent to exclude in the record, but it is not the government that is intending to exclude anybody; it is the plaintiffs, and they have every right to.

Their vision is to have a rabbinical college extraordinaire on a mountain where they will never have to be interrupted by people who are outside the faith and they needed to buy 30 acres as a buffer. It was quite explicit. Tauber said that was a buffer, to make sure that the rabbinical college would not mix with those outside the rabbinical college. That's their right. If there's any analogy to what it is that they're proposing, it's a monastery, except it's a monastery with married members. But it is deeply ironic for them to be arguing that diversity is wrong when, in this day and age, diversity is what the United States is built on.

Now, we also learned, which I found very interesting because there have been statements earlier to the contrary, students will not study at home. They will be studying together from 5:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. every day except for holy days and Shabbat. And they will be spending all that time together, but they will not be doing that at home. The studying will be in the study halls. It will be in the library, it will be in whatever the educational part of it is other than the library, it will be in the courthouse, it will be in the buildings that will be part of the school. That's in

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1 the record.

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We also learned that there are levels of Torah communities. While the phrase "Torah community" never appears in the second amended complaint, they have now added it to their list of how to explain what it is, is this rabbinical college extraordinaire. And according to those who will participate in it - Mr. Rosenberg - you do the best you can to have a Torah community, and it is not a sin if the Torah community is not perfect. And in fact, there is no sin attached to being part of a rabbinical college where you live off-campus, which is why those who have gone to all of the other rabbinical colleges have been following their beliefs even though they did not live on-campus.

So, in the end, what could possibly be going on in this case, because you have a developer, a very savvy developer, who goes on land and agrees to take over and be the owner of 100 acres and does no due diligence. He doesn't check the zoning? Well, we know why he didn't. I would have attributed this to him otherwise, but he said it at the trial. Why would you do that? He said because federal and state law gives them the right to build this college as of right. In other words, they are not required to abide by the laws that apply to everybody else. That's on page 108 of Mr. Tauber's testimony, his deposition testimony.

So, in other words, what we had here was a decision to

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purchase property, which originally was going to be a thousand families, and to use RLUIPA as the hammer to avoid the system.

We also hear in the transcript that out of 130 acres, they plan on using only about 30, and it will be the 30 that's farthest away from the community. Surely that means they'll be in close proximity to their studies, regardless of whether they're in a dorm, a single-family home, or a multi-family home if they subdivide and they get permission.

Finally, the accreditation question is one that is, in my view, lacking in fundamental integrity. Local Law No. 5 of 2004 requiring accreditation was adopted on the record when Pomona believed that Yeshiva Spring Valley was the owner of the property. An accreditation law for that ordinary school was not a problem. Pomona did not yet know at that point that the purchase had been made, did not know that Chaim Babad had paid \$13 million for a piece of property that had been worth 1.65 million. And so, the accreditation requirement was for an ordinary school, and the school regulations were to bring the regulations up to date, and, as Mayor Marshall said, he loved that project, he loved the Yeshiva Spring Valley project in that it was going to be a school of 24 homes.

What happened to that project? It wasn't run out of town. Two things happened to that project: They never complete the SEQRA requirements, and they got offered \$13 million for a piece of property that had only been worth

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1.65 million relatively recently.

So, in the end, all of the arguments about discrimination do not pan out. And all they have to rest on is, of course, the message that Mr. Stepanovich delivered, which is all they have to hope on is credibility. trying to challenge the credibility of these public servants. And I'm always shocked by the way in which "public servants" starts to sound like Darth Vader in religious land-use cases, but if they come out of Mr. Stepanovich's mouth, they sound horrific; if you read them in context and you view the people, these are not people discriminating. And how do we know? And I'll close with this: This rabbinical college extraordinaire could be built. All they would need is to put together a proposal. And we learned at trial, which is fascinating to me, shuls -- there are shuls for different parts of the world, different ethnic sources. So, the shuls are permitted, a school is permitted, study halls are permitted, libraries are permitted, courtrooms are permitted, family housing is It's already built. And so, essentially what is permitted. the bottom line here, from the perspective of reading the trial transcript, is that there was a hope that they might be able to put multi-family housing in on many, many acres without having to go through the process.

The bottom line is in this case is, ten years later, if they had done what the framers of RLUIPA would have assumed

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they would have done, which is, to ask for use variances, text amendments, or zone changes, and that's in the legislative history, they assume zone changes were part of the process that you would go through, if they had done that, in all likelihood, they would have a college right now, and maybe they'd have more than ten students. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Hamilton.

MR. PELOSO: I just wanted to follow up with some comments which were more specific, your Honor, directed to counsel's statements of this afternoon.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PELOSO: Obviously, the charts which have been presented and the arguments by Mr. Stepanovich are designed to be evidence of discriminatory intent. I was actually quite pleased to see all four of those charts be used today in oral argument because that appears to be all that there is - essentially, a collection of soundbites, most of which your Honor has ruled are not admissible for the truth.

I would encourage the Court, as I know the Court will, to look at whatever documents are referenced in those charts, to look at them in their entirety, because looking at something in a soundbite format does not tell the entire story.

I would like to address, though, some of the comments that were made this afternoon, just to show what the actual context is when in its completeness.

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Mr. Stepanovich talked about Mayor Marshall and the video. We watched the video, your Honor watched the video, and your Honor has read the transcript. I think your Honor can judge obviously as to what Mr. Marshall's intent was and what his sincerity is.

The comment about his pants being caught -- having our pants down, again, the record is very clear - this goes back to Yeshiva Spring Valley - the concern was to have laws in place to prevent schools from being built that would be unlimited in size. I would encourage your Honor in that regard to look at all the documentation on Yeshiva Spring Valley, meaning the Frederick P. Clark memos, the minutes from the meetings of the Village. There is not one reference to anything religious. What happened there was, a school came in, Clark realized the school laws were lax and were permissive, something had to be done. Admittedly, the trigger was Yeshiva Spring Valley, but it could have been any school. It happened to be a Jewish school. If it had been a Catholic school, if it had been any other school, the same thing would have happened. The Clark memos are devoid of anything religious.

Mr. Stepanovich also mentions the Rita Louie and Brett Yagel letter, why didn't they offer it. Well, the testimony at trial was, they didn't offer it is because there was a limit on the number of letters that could be submitted to the press, and they had reached their limit, so someone else submitted it on

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1 their behalf.

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Mr. Stepanovich talks about all the campaign literature and how discriminatory animus is evidenced by that. I would encourage this Court to look at each one of those exhibits and find any reference to religion or, for that matter, to Orthodox or Hasidic folks. It's just not there.

Mr. Stepanovich talks about the texts, and he says — and he quotes, "We don't want to lose this case." I don't know whether it was Mr. Yagel who said that or Ms. Louie who said that. I don't think it even matters.

Well, I don't want to lose the case. I don't think they want to lose the case. What is that evidence of? It's evidence of concern about losing the case.

Then the comment was made about various Village officials saying we need to be very careful of what they say. Well, I think that's just common sense, given the fact that, for the past five to six years, at every single public meeting, there has been a representative of Mr. Savad's office in the audience. Also, as your Honor knows, at the January 22nd meeting in 2007, they brought a videographer and they brought a stenographer. They also adjourned that meeting in December. They adjourned the meeting in December, they have the press release or the newspaper article in January, then they conveniently have a videographer for the next meeting.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question about that. To

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the extent that the concern that the town officials had was the scope and the size of the yet-to-be-proposed college, why do you have to be careful about expressing that concern?

MR. PELOSO: The care about expressing any concern about Tartikov throughout the history of this case has been that any statement about, for example, someone says we don't think the Tartikov proposal, the Tartikov development is appropriate for this Village, okay, is interpreted as being anti-Semitic.

THE COURT: So, I remember. It was, I think, the oral argument on the motion to dismiss, Ms. Hamilton got up and said what we don't want is Wake Forest University in our town. And I thought that was a very poignant way of describing the concern a community might have about the size and scope of a yet-to-be-proposed institution. She didn't mince her words. She didn't feel like she had to be careful. There was no way anybody would interpret that statement as anti-Semitic.

So, if a statement like that, which I think was, as I said it was very poignant, it was very powerful, can be made by somebody who, obviously, as a trained lawyer, who does lots of RLUIPA litigation, she didn't hesitate in the slightest to say that, then why would somebody who has that concern be worried about how their words would be misinterpreted?

MR. PELOSO: Because there was always a lawyer from Tartikov at every public heeding.

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THE COURT: There were lawyers for Tartikov when Ms. Hamilton said what she said.

MR. PELOSO: Because every statement has been twisted as far as it can be twisted. I think if I was a Village official, I would have the same concerns, because if I say I'm against the Tartikov development because my village of 3400 people would become a Village of 8500 people, I'm labeled as anti-Semitic. It might be overreaction, but it's overreaction. It's human nature.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PELOSO: Mr. Stepanovich mentions Mr. Prol and Mr. Cook. I would, of course, remind your Honor that Mr. Prol became a planning board member in 2008. He had nothing to do with any of the laws. He testified very poignantly as to that fact.

Mr. Cook rotated off of the planning board in 2003. He similarly testified he had nothing to do with any of the laws. And I would say that any statements of Mr. Cook, which could be interpreted as revealing animus, were made in 2014 at his deposition, far beyond the time frame when any of these laws were enacted.

The key element, your Honor, that I want to mention, and Ms. Hamilton has touched on this, is that aside from the fact that the majority of these statements were made by anonymous persons, and aside from the fact that, from a legal

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point of view, they are not for the truth, let's talk about the connection. Let's talk about the law here.

The law specifies that the plaintiffs must show that the defendants enacted laws because of, and not merely in spite of, the adverse effect on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs must show that discriminatory intent was a significant reason for the enactment of the laws. The plaintiffs must show that the laws were adopted to discriminate against religion. The plaintiffs must show that comments by the public actually motivated the trustees and were a significant factor.

Now, let's look at these facts. Each trustee at this trial testified that the laws were not enacted because of Tartikov, they were not enacted to prevent Tartikov's development, and they were not enacted at all with Orthodox or Hasidic individuals in mind.

Doris Ulman, the Village counsel, testified in her affidavit that she attended every single meeting where a Village law was being discussed, and that in none of the meetings, were any statements made that any of the laws were directed at Tartikov or any of the statements contained animus or any statements were made directed to Orthodox or Hasidic Jews.

Now, let's talk about comments from the public, and let's talk about the testimony of the trustees in response to those comments. Alma Roman testified that discriminatory

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comments were not considered by the Board of Trustees in enacting the laws. Ian Banks testified that he sometimes took comments of the public into consideration, but that if he disagreed with the comments, he disagreed with them and would not consider them. Brett Yagel testified that he doesn't always agree with the comments of his constituents and, moreover, he takes into account heavily the counsel of the Village attorney.

As I read the court record, your Honor, the most they have in terms of comments by the Village officials are two:

Alan Lamer testified that, quote, "He listened to public opinions." Nicholas Sanderson said that he considered the public's concerns. That's it, and that's just not enough. In fact, that's nothing.

Let's talk for a minute, though, about Tartikov. And since this case is heavily about the concept of sincerity, let's talk about Tartikov for a second. When Mr. Tauber bought the property in 2004, he told Rabbi Fromowitz, who was at the Yeshiva Spring Valley, that he intended to build townhouses and he intended to sue under RLUIPA. When Mr. Fromowitz was deposed many years later in connection with this lawsuit, he said that the idea or that the thought that there was going to be a rabbinical college was a, quote, "complete surprise to him."

Ms. Hamilton mentioned that Mr. Tauber and no one at

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Tartikov ever consulted any of the education laws of the Village. That makes complete sense to me. Why consult the education laws if you have no intention to build a school?

It's kind of interesting that Mr. Tauber has 30-some-odd years of experience as a developer and testified that he always consults all the laws and hires consultants to find out what he can and cannot build, but in this one situation where he spends \$13 million, he doesn't bother to do so. So, I would submit, your Honor, the reason is he knew exactly what he intended to do; he intended to sue.

Let's talk a little bit more about Tartikov. There is no evidence of a curriculum before the lawsuit was filed.

After the lawsuit was filed and when this litigation was beginning, there was a one-page curriculum authored by one of the students at the request of Tartikov's lawyers. There is nothing in Tartikov's Certificate of Incorporation which talks about a rabbinical college. There is, however, a paragraph in the Certificate of Incorporation which talks about one of its purposes is to provide housing.

The Certificate of Incorporation for Tartikov also describes what is a much broader institution than the very narrow rabbinical college that has been proposed. I find it curious that this certificate was never shown to Bernard Fryshman, who was of AARTS, that is the accrediting agency. I suspect, and this is speculation on my part, that if that were

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shown to the director of AARTS, he said this institution might be able to be accredited because it is very broad in what it intends to achieve. There are no actual plans for the rabbinical college, or none that have been produced in this case.

It is also interesting that when Mr. Tauber bought the property in 2004, he was made, shortly thereafter, a trustee of Tartikov for the purposes of litigation. It's interesting also that Mr. Savad spoke with Ms. Ulman in 2007, May of 2007, and gave her the details of the college, which consisted of simply two things: It could not be accredited and it would be a college and it would have housing. Ms. Ulman suggested that Mr. Savad apply for a variance. None was ever applied for. Instead, suit was filed.

I've already discussed the interesting sequence of events where Mr. Savad, in the fall of 2006, adjourned the meeting on, among other things, Local Law 1 of 2007, or it later became that law. Then, interestingly, in January of 2007, an article appeared, authored by Saccardi & Schiff, which was the consultant of Tartikov, saying that there would be 1,000 rabbis, 5,000 people, 9 residential apartments -- I'm sorry -- 9 residential buildings, four- to six storeys in height. And then, of course, shortly after that news article, the adjourned meeting, at the request of Mr. Savad, is held, which the people appear, and Tartikov appears with his

170907congreOA Argument 1 videographer and his stenographer. 2 I have really just two final thoughts --3 THE COURT: Can we pause on that for a second. 4 MR. PELOSO: Certainly. 5 THE COURT: Let's play this out. 6 So, Tartikov brings this lawsuit. He hires officers 7 of the Court to draft up a complaint where they are governed by 8 Rule 11 and alleges that Tartikov wants to build a rabbinical 9 college but can't because of what plaintiffs say is a series of 10 discriminatory law that prevents them from building the college. The goal of the lawsuit presumably is to win, right, 11 12 so that they can build what they say they want to build. And 13 is the theory that, when all is said and done and plaintiffs 14 really do win this lawsuit, they're going to build townhouses and not a college? 15 16 MR. PELOSO: Correct. Correct. 17 THE COURT: So, let's play that out some more. 18 As I understood it from the very beginning of the 19 trial, what plaintiffs said was, what they were seeking at this 20 stage in this lawsuit, was the right to apply - I think that's 21 how it was phrased, right - the right to apply to build the 2.2. rabbinical college. So, if they win this lawsuit, and you're 23 right, okay, your theory is right, then when they go to apply,

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actually, we're not going to apply for a college, we're going

when they go to the Village board, they're going to say,

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1 to do the Tauber Townhouse Development.

MR. PELOSO: No. I have no doubt they'll apply for a college, but who's going to --

THE COURT: Hang on. So, let's play it out.

Let's say that it's approved, and then they're going to say, oh, never mind, we're not going to build the college you approved, we're going to build townhouses, and somehow that's just going to happen?

MR. PELOSO: I would say, your Honor, that the college that will be built will not be in any way the college that was described in this case.

THE COURT: But they would have to make a proposal to the Village board. And Ms. Hamilton has been understandably on this theme from day one, we still don't know what it is, but when they go to make a proposal, they're going to have to -- I have no idea what's involved in all of this, but I imagine, you have to show up with more than, like, a drawing on the back of a napkin, right? Because you have to deal with SEQRA, you have to deal with all kinds of issues, you have to be fairly specific about what you want to build; right?

So, they're going to have to say, Here's what our college is going to look like. Here's an architectural plan. You're going to do an architectural plan? Experts? You're shaking your head "yes." So, here's our architectural plan, and here's how big it's going to be, here's how many square

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feet it's going to cover, and here's how we're going to deal with environmental issues, and traffic issues, and everything else. And then, all of that would be a ruse. Once it's approved, they're going to, like, in the middle of the night, they're going to build townhouses? MR. PELOSO: One moment, your Honor. THE COURT: Please. Of course. (Counsel confer) MR. PELOSO: In answer to your Honor's question, we believe that they would probably go ahead and propose a college. They would have to propose plans for a college. THE COURT: Right. And let's assume it gets approved. The college would consist of multi-family MR. PELOSO: housing, assuming that was allowed, the college would likely consist of a synagogue, a study hall, a mikvah, all the things that were described. THE COURT: Yes. MR. PELOSO: It would probably have about five to ten students, so that the 99.9 percent function of the actual property would be housing. THE COURT: Right, but -- so, if it had ten students and each student had, you know, a spouse and some number of children, that's why it would be 90-something-percent non-student, but it would still be a college, right?

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MR. PELOSO: It would be a college, I would say, in

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1 name only.

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THE COURT: Right, but it also -- I mean, name only?

So, what? It's really a ruse to get ten families into

townhouses? Is that the idea? Ten families that would

compromise -- let's assume an average family size of one -
let's assume ten. So, you're going to have 100 people in this

townhouse complex?

Is that really what's stoking this whole thing?

MR. PELOSO: Well, I would say from the Village's

point of view, the feeling has always been that Mr. Tauber's

intention is to build housing for the Orthodox community, which

we think is a noble pursuit, but we do not think it's correct

to go through the idea of making it a rabbinical college that's

going to have 500 or 1,000 students, and that's borne out by

the fact that after ten or so years, he's only got ten

students.

THE COURT: I'm struck by that. Could it be one of the reasons there was only ten students is because of this lawsuit and the uncertainly that it brings?

Like, if you're some 20-something-year-old person and somebody comes to you and says, Hey, do you want to go to rabbinical college? Sure. You know, it's 15 years of study. Umm, okay, I'll still do it. Where do I start? Well, it hasn't been built yet. Well, actually, it hasn't even been designed yet. Well, actually, it's in a federal lawsuit. Oh.

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170907congreOA Argument When is that going to end? Well, have you heard about the judge? It's never going to end. I'm going to be 50 by the time this case is over with. Forget it! MR. PELOSO: I would submit, your Honor, that in order to increase their chances of success, the plaintiffs would likely want to have as many potential students as possible. certainly would. THE COURT: You can argue that they're being honest about the fact that they don't have a thousand students ready to go. Again, I think the uncertainty created by the lawsuit, to any rational decision-maker, that would be an issue. might dissuade some from signing on the dotted line. MR. PELOSO: I don't think there was evidence to that effect. THE COURT: Would you go to a law school -- if they say, you can go to law school, but the school isn't built yet, you wouldn't sign onto that. MR. PELOSO: Certainly, if I knew that there was going was an institution that was going to offer me the opportunity to study for 15 years and have my expenses paid, I would sign

to be -- if I wanted to become a rabbinical judge, and if there up in a heartbeat.

THE COURT: Except, you don't know when it's going to happen.

MR. PELOSO: I would get my name on the list.

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1 THE COURT: Maybe you would. Maybe you wouldn't. 2 You'd be one of the ten, then. 3 MR. PELOSO: If I were Mr. Tauber, I would want my 4 name on the list, so that when I presented it to your Honor, I 5 would show that I have 200 students waiting. 6 THE COURT: Right. So, what does that say about the 7 veracity about the representation of ten? That's probably a 8 real number. They're not exaggerating. It's not really five. 9 So, let's double it. 10 MR. PELOSO: I think, if there's a low number, it's 11 not necessarily because -- I don't know whether it's because of 12 lack of interest, but it certainly shows that Tartikov or 1.3 Tauber, if you want to look at them as one in the same, 14 has not made any effort to go out and to try to recruit 15 students; and that, in my opinion, suggests that there isn't a 16 concern or there isn't even a desire to actually build a 17 college. 18 THE COURT: But I don't know how one can recruit for 19 something that doesn't exist, and it may never exist, or it may 20 exist many, many years down the road. 21 MR. PELOSO: The plaintiffs' prospective students 22 testified that they've signed up because if and when it is 23 built, they intend to attend the college. 24 THE COURT: Right. And plenty of other people might

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have said, Look, I'm not going to wait around, right?

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MR. PELOSO: That's entirely possible; yes. 1 2 THE COURT: I guess I'm still at a loss to understand 3 how Mr. Tauber gets to the end game of having a townhouse 4 complex, because the ten number is being used to say, Well, 5 really, of the people who would live on the campus, only ten 6 percent of them are actually going to be students. So, that 7 argument, I suppose, is sort of saying, really what this is 8 about is, the students are being used as the shoehorn to get 9 nine other people into the housing, but if there's only ten 10 students, then you're talking about 100 people, which it's not 11 Wake Forest. 12 MR. PELOSO: Our belief is that I fully acknowledge 1.3 that's what's been represented at trial. What was represented 14 at trial was that only students would be allowed to live on 15 campus - students, obviously, their families, and faculty members. It's our belief that if this development were built 16 17 now, that would not be the case. 18 THE COURT: What would not be the case? 19 MR. PELOSO: That the only people living on the campus 20 would be students, their families, and faculty. 21 THE COURT: Right, but how does that make it a 22 townhouse complex? MR. PELOSO: Well, it's not just a townhouse complex, 23 but if, in our hypothetical - and that word's been used a lot 24 25 in the past few months - if, in my hypothetical, there are ten

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students and then there are -- 90 percent of the other residents are not students, I guess it's still a college, but in a *de facto* sense, it's essentially housing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PELOSO: I'd like to close, your Honor, by just simply reading a snippet from a Second Department decision in a case your Honor may very well be aware of, which is the Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapo. And the Court said the following: "A municipality is more than the collection of pavement, pipes and other improvements that make up its infrastructure. Rather, a village is a local government unit with broad powers, conferred not by legislative grant, but as a matter of constitutional entitlement. In the furtherance of this authority, municipal officials exercise a broad array of powers with respect to the nature of the community, including the powers to protect and enhance the physical and physical environment. The power to define the community character is a unique prerogative of a municipality acting in its governmental capacity. All of the other entities of local government, including its electoral and legislative processes, management policies, and fiscal decisions are ultimately aimed at determining and maintaining the community that its residents desire."

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

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MR. STORZER: May I have rebuttal.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. STORZER: Your Honor, I'm going to address mostly the points that were made by Ms. Hamilton, but with respect to that last issue where there was some back and forth on, this idea that I think it's essentially an attack of the sincerity of the plaintiffs here with respect to what they intend to build. We don't have to go back to 2007 when plaintiffs filed the lawsuit or go back to 2004 when property was purchased. We're talking about a family and a history that goes back for four centuries.

We're going back to the 1600s in Eastern Europe, a family that has this history, this tradition of building, of studying, of praying — these rabbinical colleges, training rabbinical students to be judges, going through that kind of history, having these kinds of institutions throughout the old countries, going through the Holocaust, having them destroyed, coming to this country, attempting to rebuild, trying to create this institution that once existed and now that they want to have exist again. If this is a plan to build some townhouses, this really is playing the long game. It's, I think, beyond reasonable to argue that this is anything but a sincere effort to build a college. And I think ultimately that was essentially agreed to by opposing counsel.

The question of whether that college would be used for

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people that were not students, people that were not associated with it, that's easily solved. The evidence showed that the Village can place conditions on permits, can say everybody has to be a student at the college or a family member of a student. That's not an issue.

If it becomes something else after approvals were granted, well, the Village has the power to enforce its zoning code. If something was a college and then became a townhouse development, an apartment building, something else, some other type of land-use, the Village has means of addressing that. That's not a reasonable fear here.

THE COURT: Can I play devil's advocate to that?

There are sort of two pieces to that. There's

fear/perception. To the extent that people in this community

were of the view that the school was really going to be, not

quite a pretext, but would be -- as I said, it's almost like

the shoehorn that would get a facility in Pomona, and let's

say, instead ten students, there were a thousand students, and

then you have the same multiplier in terms of the families of

the students, now you're talking about -- instead 100 people,

you're talking about 10,000 people, and then it is Wake Forest

University.

And whether you want to call it a college or you want to call it a college with adult student housing, to the community, it might look like a townhouse development, right,

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even though there might be studying and learning going on, the vast, vast majority of the people who are living on the facility are not the students or the teachers.

So, if that's a concern that people have, then what's wrong with that?

MR. STORZER: Well, there are many different layers to that question. The first is, there's an important fact that we're overlooking here in terms of what the Village residents said at that meeting and the laws that were passed.

That meeting happened January 22, 2007. Local Law 1 of 2007 was passed on that date, but it was considered and introduced way before that meeting, before the leaked plan was ever published, before there was any concept of a thousand students, before there was any fear of any specific project that may or may not have whatever they consider to be a large-scale, large-size facility. The ordinance was drawn up.

We know that the Village board illegally held meetings where they discussed something that was related to Tartikov, to Camp Dora. There was no litigation going on. What were they talking about? Then this ordinance comes out. There's a clear inference there.

THE COURT: Your point is that the inference from that chronology is the fear not of Wake Forest, but the fear of Hasidic Jewish people having some kind of an institution, having some ownership of property in Pomona.

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1 MR. STORZER: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Regardless of what the plans are or whether it is to be or perceived to be.

MR. STORZER: Exactly. The thousand wasn't even a gleam in the Village's eyes at that point or the residents' eyes at that point.

Most importantly, --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STORZER: -- again, you can have Wake Forest or you can have a smaller version of Wake Forest on this property. Again, this is undisputed. You can put a traditional college. You can put dormitories. You can have a thousand students if they fit within the impervious surface coverage restrictions, restrictions that we're not challenging in this suit. There's a 25 percent limitation. You can only build up to 25 percent of the property, including driveways, roads, housing, classrooms, athletic facilities, everything, you can put that there. That's not an issue. The question is, who it is that they're putting there.

In this case, if an application was made for a special permit, let's say the use was permitted, students were allowed to have families and live on campus, and a non-accredited educational institution was permitted, and they couldn't build a facility for a thousand students because it would obviously make up more than the impervious surface limitations, then it's

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not going to be permitted. If Tartikov wants to apply for a variance from that provision, they, like any other applicant, would have the ability to do that, and the Village could deny it if it had the grounds to do it.

THE COURT: Let's play that out, too. Isn't there a height limit?

MR. STORZER: There's a height limitation. That is something we are challenging. There's a height limitation to the housing to the dormitory.

THE COURT: Right. Part of the argument that you make in terms of strict scrutiny is narrowly tailored or lesser restrictive, right, that there are other things that the Village, in evaluating an actual proposal, can cite in determining whether or not to grant either the proposal or a variance, right?

MR. STORZER: Absolutely.

THE COURT: So, if you play that out, and there are some things where Tartikov says would need a variance and the Village says no, we're not giving you the variance, community character, it's too big, they don't want Wake Forest, does anybody have any doubt as to where you-all are going to be the day after that happens?

MR. STORZER: That depends, your Honor. If Tartikov tries to build a 15-storey building and it's denied based on the fire engines won't be able to use their equipment to reach

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the higher floors or it's going to actually have a real impact on the community, it would be, I think, foolhardy to attempt to challenge that, to go through another ten years of litigation and pursue a lawsuit that they know is not going to be successful. It would be an as-applied challenge.

We've seen these kinds of challenges happen in the court. Sometimes they win, sometimes they lose. Depends on what it is. But right now, the height limitation in the Village is 35 feet for single-family homes. For the housing for a college, it's 25 feet. That's irrational. That's unreasonable. Again, there are the other provisions of RLUIPA and limitations and so on.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. STORZER: So, if they're allowed to build, and if they built 25 feet, that's allowed under the rules. If the 25-foot limitation is struck down and they're stuck with 35 feet, they'll build 35 feet. If they apply for a variance to 40 feet, you know, under whatever state law standards there are, the Village will approve it or deny it, and then the remedies that might be available for relief would be pursued, but they don't have that choice. They don't have the chance to apply for it. They don't have the chance to apply for variances or go through this application process.

And on that point, I'd like to address something that Ms. Hamilton started with, which is, again, these words run

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together, so it's sort of, like, one big word: use variance, text amendment, zone change. Let's parse that. There's no use variance. I'll move on from that.

THE COURT: No. Go ahead. Say your piece. Say your piece.

MR. STORZER: Again, the Village's representatives admitted we could not get a use variance. The law says we cannot get a use variance; that is, there is no dispute as to that. Zone change, no such thing. The words "zone change," the concept of it does not exist in the Village code. The only way that theoretically they can come in is through a change in the laws themselves. And, again, if that is something that the Court would hold is required in order to demonstrate either standing or a substantial burden on a religious exercise, then no RLUIPA case could ever be successful if an ordinance is challenged like this because the laws can always be changed. That is really what is at issue here.

But going back to the application question, being treated the same is what Tartikov is looking for here; being able to build as much as an accredited college can build, as a college with normal -- not normal -- but typical dormitories that are permitted under the code. There was the issue that was raised about why didn't Michael Tauber do his due diligence. As we argued in our brief, and I think it was absolutely demonstrated at trial, the use was permitted prior

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to the enactment of Local Law No. 5 of 2004. The code that — the provisions of the law that were adopted in 2001 did not prohibit housing for colleges, for other educational institutions that were permitted under the code. They weren't prohibited for, quote, schools, but we did not meet the definition of a school. We fell under the other part of the definition, which allowed other types of educational facilities.

But putting that aside, we're not challenging those laws. We're challenging the laws that were passed after they purchased the property. We're challenging Local Law No. 5 of 2004, Local Law 1 of 2007, and Local Law 5 of 2007. The issue of Local Law 1 of 2001 that we are challenging in this suit is somewhat distinct, and that's more of a facial challenge related to the differential treatment of religious assemblies and institutions and non-religious assemblies and institutions, treating the building coverage requirements and the floor area ratios differently between, say, museums, libraries, recreational facilities, and this particular use that's at issue here.

THE COURT: On that point, the stip that went through all of this, this is the stip -- I want to make sure -- the joint stip, paragraph 6 says permitted land-uses as of right within the R40 zoning districts are one-family residences, houses of worship, public utilities, rights-of-way, libraries,

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and museums, other public parks and playgrounds, and 1 2 agricultural pursuits. 3 I thought that was not right; I thought houses of 4 worship were not as of right. 5 MR. STORZER: Houses of worship are a special permit 6 use, which I'm not sure --7 THE COURT: Sure. So, what is one to do with a jointly-stipulated fact that's wrong? 8 9 MR. PELOSO: We can certainly amend it, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: I guess we can amend it right now, right? 11 I thought that was right, but I just want to make sure I didn't --12 1.3 MR. STORZER: Recreational facilities are also allowed 14 as a special permit use, but not subject to those same building 15 coverages, but they are restrictions. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. I'm sorry. I just 17 wanted to make sure that I didn't lose that thought. 18 MR. STORZER: All right. Again, the so-called fear of 19 the size had nothing to do with the introduction and 20 consideration prior to the so-called leak of the plan that the 21 Village was planning to adopt this ordinance. We know that 2.2. they met in secret for ten meetings. We know that it was about 23 Tartikov. We know that there wasn't any current litigation 24 going on. It doesn't answer that question. 25 And if there was some concern about size, the Village

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didn't pass a law saying, okay, some family housing won't be allowed or we will limit it in some way that we think the goals of the Village are met. They maintained the existing law of 2004: No family housing is permitted. There is a critical point. And, again, my co-counsel might disagree with me, but I think the most important fact in this case is what happened at the same time that they passed Local Law No. 5 of 2004, and that was the Village suing the Town of Ramapo to try to get rid of exactly the kind of use that the Village got rid of within its own jurisdiction.

They say that this is an unusual use. They've argued repeatedly, how could we have planned for this. The township's or the Village's expert witness saying jurisdictions can't plan for every kind of crazy use that comes down the pike.

They knew about this use. They filed the petition in Supreme Court to prevent the Town of Ramapo from doing exactly the same thing. Ms. Ulman was the Village attorney for the Village of Chestnut Ridge. We know that she admitted she probably wrote the law that did exactly the same thing within that jurisdiction. This wasn't a surprise to the Village. They knew exactly what they were doing. They saw it happening in the Town of Ramapo, and they wanted to make sure that it wasn't going to happen in Pomona.

The ten-students issue, again, I think the Court has addressed this completely, but I would say at the end of it,

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even if it was ten students, so what? So, there's only ten students on a 100-hundred-acre property. Surely, that would be consistent with the Village's goal of what they are saying should take place on that property, would leave it mostly open space, have very minimal use of the property. Obviously, that's not the case.

If Tartikov is allowed to apply on equal terms and build this facility, there will be applications coming in. The issue of whether there are enough judges --

THE COURT: You had the line, right, from "Field of Dreams." It was there for you. The alley-oop was there.

MR. SAVAD: "Build it and they will come."

THE COURT: Right?

MR. STORZER: Right. Absolutely.

And we know that this is going on, that there is a burgeoning Hasidic ultra-Orthodox Jewish population happening both here in Rockland County and other places, around Lakewood Township, New Jersey, and so on. These people exist. They have children. Where should they go? Should the villages be allowed to build a wall, build a wall around Monsey, build a wall around Lakewood, tell them that they're not allowed to come within their jurisdiction, to sequester them? That's really what's happening here, your Honor.

And I think that there are some important policy considerations. Towns, villages in the northeast are looking

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at this case. I know that. I do a lot of work in this area. I'm asked about this case constantly. Do we want to give them free rein to pass these kinds of laws to prohibit Arabs as I've seen is the latest thing; to pass laws to prevent real estate agents from being able to market properties to the population because there is this burgeoning need for it; to require property owners to register with the jurisdictions because there is some fear that the owners are actually Hasidic or other types of ultra-Orthodox Jews? That's what is at issue here.

I want to move on to the substantial burden question.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STORZER: What you heard here today is, again, what you heard throughout this lawsuit from the defendants: There's no substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious exercise because this isn't necessary for their religious beliefs, that they wouldn't be sitting if they don't study at this rabbinical college. That's not the law. The RLUIPA says so, the Supreme Court has said so.

Issues of religious exercise — this Court in the Bikur Cholim v. Village of Suffern litigation, where I represent the plaintiffs as well, said that religious exercise that is aspirational is entitled to just as much protection as religious exercise which is necessary.

We believe that this is necessary for our clients, but

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1 that's not the standard. The standard is, is this religious, 2 is it motivated by sincere religious belief, and that's been 3 proven here. 4 The Court heard the testimony of these plaintiffs. 5 This isn't a game for them. This isn't some ruse to help 6 Michael Tauber out to build townhouses. They want to study. 7 They are studying. They want to be able to do it in a way that 8 they believe is the best way for them to reach their goals, to 9 do what their religion, what their God tells them to do. 10 Whether it's a sin or not, that's not the issue. 11 On that point, because we have two different types of 12 plaintiffs here, because we have Tartikov as the plaintiff, 1.3 which has rights somewhat different than the rights of the 14 individual plaintiffs --15 THE COURT: Just so we're all on the same page, there 16 are three individual plaintiffs who are still left, right? 17 MR. STORZER: I believe there's five. 18 THE COURT: Who do you count as the five? 19 MS. SOBEL: The other two students are -- I'm going --20 we have some of the teachers, Mordechai Babad and Wolf Brief 21 and Hermen Kahana are also teachers and deans who are 2.2. plaintiffs; and then the students are Meir Margulis, Gergely 23 Neuman -- I'm sorry, Neuman is out -- Meilech Menczer, Jacob

THE COURT: Who did you say was out?

Hershkowitz, Chaim Rosenberg, and David Menczer.

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MS. SOBEL: Gergely Neuman and Aryeh Royde, they were actually dismissed from the complaint when we started back up after the motion to dismiss when discovery started. They couldn't wait anymore, and they had to start doing other things.

THE COURT: Okay. Fine. Glad I asked. Thanks.

MR. STORZER: Putting the specific religious interests of the individual plaintiffs aside, which I think was really the focus of defendants' argument here, we have Tartikov.

Tartikov has the right -- just as in the Bikur Cholim case,

Rabbi Lauber certainly had stronger claims according to the

Court in that case because of the situation of the other individual plaintiffs that were at issue.

If the Court believes that Tartikov has the right to build this religious college, this rabbinical school, and it goes ahead and does so, then the school becomes available, the school becomes available for the individual plaintiffs; and then they actually do have, as the Court has heard, a religious obligation to attend it, to avoid the sin of bitul Torah, because there is this facility available for them, and for them not to use it would be a waste of the study of the Torah.

So, I don't think this is bootstrapping. I think that if the college is allowed to exist, then the claims of the individual plaintiffs become that much stronger, but, again, we don't believe that that's what's necessary to prove this case.

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what the law says. And I think we're all on the same page as to what the law says. And I think another way of maybe framing the defendants' position -- and counsel, let me know if I'm wrong -- is maybe challenging the sincerity of the belief that the housing is necessary -- I think necessary -- that the housing is part of the religious exercise of even becoming a rabbinical judge. And part of their argument is that there are other rabbinical colleges where there is no on-campus housing. I mean, we talked about this even during the course of the trial. And that even if it's nearby, there are houses that are nearby that could accommodate the ten students, so you're talking about a walk of a short distance.

The other point that gets made in their papers is the whole notion of the Torah community they say is something that was - my word, not theirs - sort of ginned up after the lawsuit. It's not in the complaint. It's sort of a theory that was adopted post hoc as a way to sort of meet that test.

So, if you want to comment on that.

MR. STORZER: It most certainly was in the complaint. The term Torah community might not have existed in the complaint, but the concept of living on campus, to be there, to be in this kind of intense religious learning environment was described in that. And my co-counsel is looking up the specific paragraphs of the complaint as we speak. I should have had that ready. We were talking about that the other day,

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With respect to what other colleges do, I think the evidence was clear that there is, first of all, no other college like this that exists. One in Israel.

The other thing is, again, this is getting back to the necessity question. The question is not, Can they possibly engage in some other different type of religious exercise because somebody else is doing it? It is, Do they sincerely believe that this is what they should do according to their religious beliefs? Should they be in this environment where their peers live beside them, their teachers live beside them, they can study with them day and night. They are constantly immersed. They can take care of their families. During the Sabbath, they don't have the problem of being able to go back and forth to religious services and so on and study without the problem of driving a vehicle.

Is it important to be sequestered from the outside world specifically? And I think the Court heard this testimony, that this is not simply an issue of convenience. This is not simply an issue of, You don't have to walk a couple of extra blocks, like was the issue in the Eleventh Circuit's Midrash Sephardi case. Being there itself is an important component of this proposed religious facility.

I don't want to stand here and repeat the words of the witnesses that explained why that's important, but the Court

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heard it, and it's certainly the Court's right and duty to judge the sincerity of those witnesses. And we don't think that there was any basis to doubt that, but to say that the beliefs are insignificant, to say that they're not central, to say they can do it some other way, again, the text of RLUIPA and the Courts have said that's not a permissible inquiry.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STORZER: I'm being pointed to paragraph 64, and I know that there are others as well in the complaint.

THE COURT: Hang on one second.

MR. STORZER: Sorry. I was looking down.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. STORZER: Thank you, your Honor.

We heard that the Village's concern was that they wanted to oppose overdevelopment at the same time they passed a law permitting colleges, permitting dormitories, permitting them to the same extent that we're asking Tartikov to be permitted, too.

I don't understand the argument that we wanted to keep out development, so we're going to allow this massive institutional use. Again, to allow that, but to specifically gerrymander the use to prohibit student family housing, which they know will keep out the Hasidic groups, and we know that because they petitioned the state courts to keep that use out of the Town of Ramapo, we know that because we know that the

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Argument

Village attorney did the same thing in another jurisdiction. 1 2 That is an unconstitutional gerrymander. It's a gerrymander 3 that violates RLUIPA, not to mention the other uses that are 4 permitted - libraries, museums, recreational facilities. It's 5 not just single-family residences that are allowed in the 6 Village. 7 We heard that this RLUIPA was being used as a hammer 8 or that Tartikov is being used as a hammer here. Again, 9 Tartikov purchased this property before these laws were passed. 10 Were they supposed to have predicted that the Village would take these steps to ban their use? 11 12 THE COURT: Well, they knew about the law from 2001. 1.3 MR. STORZER: And again, that law is a little bit 14 different. It's an issue of differential treatment between other -- non-religious assemblies, institutions and the others, 15 16 and it stands in a little bit different footing. And I'm not 17 sure we would be here today if that was the only law at issue. 18 THE COURT: By the way, one of the points that you 19 make on some of the challenged laws is that there was a failure 20 to go through a SEQRA process. 21 Is that something that Pomona has to do every time it 22 adopts a law, a land-use law? 23 MR. STORZER: There are specific standards that they 24 have to meet. Standing here today, I think it has something to

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do with environmental impacts, whether it's a type 1-,

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type 2-type decision. Under certain circumstances, they have to do that. With respect to Local Law 1 of 2001, it was required. They didn't do it. There's no dispute as to that.

And, again, the importance of that is that it just adds onto this pile of arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to state law treatment actions that the Village has engaged in, and that's relevant to the substantial burden question as the Second Circuit really has focused on in terms of the Westchester Day School and Fortress Bible Church decisions.

THE COURT: Well, as to the students of the -- legal challenge to the Ramapo Adult Student Housing Law, one of the arguments was that they didn't go through the SEQRA process.

MR. STORZER: Yes. That is ironic, your Honor.

THE COURT: Indeed.

MR. STORZER: And, again, this is in our papers. This challenge to Ramapo's actions was not just about an overdevelopment; it was about the specific community that was explicit in their papers. They mentioned the Hasidic community, they mentioned the religious needs of this community as the basis for their challenge.

With respect to Prol and Cook, one of these sheets that we have, it was argued that they were not on the board that passed these laws, adopted the ordinances. That's not the point. The point is that they were clear examples of the Village residents that the board was responsive to. They lived

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Argument

in the Village, they had the ears of the Village officials. One was even appointed to the planning board after he made these kinds of comments. Again, that's evidence as to the responsiveness of the board here.

It was pointed out, I believe, by Mr. Peloso that the standard here for the discrimination claim was whether the discriminatory motivation was a significant factor, and he was correct on that. What he didn't mention is that the Second Circuit has had the opportunity to inquire as to what that really means. And what the Second Circuit said is, it doesn't mean that it's the dominant factor; it just has to be a significant factor. It doesn't have to be the greatest factor, it doesn't have to be a significant factor. And I think, as Mr. Stepanovich argued, that clearly existed here.

Another important point we've argued in our briefs, and I wanted to underscore this because it is critical here, to the extent that the Court may not see all of the opposition as based on specific ill-will or animus, again, while that is sufficient to demonstrate discrimination, it's not necessary. What is necessary is that Hasidic/Orthodox Jews were targeted based on their religious beliefs, religious denomination.

The Hassan v. City of New York case is an excellent example of that. The Third Circuit there held that you could not target Muslims because you are concerned legitimately about

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terrorism. That's not permitted. Even if the subjective motivations of the police enforcement agencies was legitimate, was concerned about erasing terrorism, you still cannot target Muslim groups. You can't target black or Hispanic groups for enforcement actions in the City of New York based on the belief that they commit more crimes, as this Court has held.

If the concern is about overdevelopment, the Village can't target Hasidic Jews because of it. Just because they believe that Hasidic Jews are the reason that there are so many Section 8 payments, that that's why the tax base is hurting, that's why the public schools are suffering, that's why condos are being built, they can't target that specific use, even if their subjective motivations were legitimate. And I think they certainly weren't in this case, but even if they were, it's not permitted. The only thing that's required is that we show that this group was targeted.

There are other claims that we have in this case, and I'm sure the Court will have other questions. I could spend another three hours here if I had the opportunity. I'm not going to do that.

I do want to point out that we do have a claim under the New York Constitution. That provision requires a balancing of the interests here. Even if the Court were to find that we did not meet the level of substantial in terms of the burden on religious exercise, that's not relevant for our claim under the

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New York Constitution.

There is certainly some burden on the plaintiffs here. We think it is a complete burden. We think it certainly meets the level of substantial, but whatever the extent of that burden is, it's balanced against nothing. There is no interest here that is served by these challenged laws. I know that the Court read the defendants' brief. There's nothing argued in there. There's no section in there talking about the governmental interest, whether they're compelling, important, or even just legitimate.

I don't know if they've given up that argument because of what happened at trial, but there's nothing there.

THE COURT: Come on, Ms. Hamilton.

MR. STORZER: We heard certain things throughout this litigation: community character, traffic, the environmental interests, and then a whole host of more procedural aspects.

We wanted to tidy up our laws; that sort of thing.

We heard from Ms. Ulman at trial that the purposes that the Village had to adopt these laws, none of them were served by the particular provisions that were at issue here. And all of them could have been achieved by not adopting those provisions or by adopting different provisions. There's no dispute about that. There's no evidence that the defendants have introduced at trial regarding traffic. There's no issue. Our traffic expert certainly demonstrated that this was not an

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Community character? The defendants' own planner expert witness admitted that a rabbinical college with student family housing could be built in a way that was sympathetic with the community character of the Village.

And the environmental interests? They get complicated. We had Ms. Beall testifying about that. To the extent that the challenged laws had any effect at all on the environment, they were contrary to those interests rather than helping them.

So, given the absence of any legitimate interests that are at issue here, we believe that the easiest claim is our claim under the New York Constitution. I just wanted to point that out before I finished.

And my co-counsel, Donna Sobel, has a few words on the discrimination facts, if the Court would permit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SOBEL: Thank you, your Honor. Good afternoon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. SOBEL: Defendants' counsel has argued that we haven't proven that there's a connection between the community comments and the decisions of the public officials.

Your Honor, the defendants' counsel said that there were just two statements and they did not seem impressed with what those statements are, but we want to make it clear, that's

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1 | not all there is.

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And I specifically want to turn your attention to that January 22, 2007 meeting where, as we saw earlier today, there were many comments that had nothing to do with size and scale, but it was worried about the tax base and people taking over the community and things like that.

During that time frame, they were considering changing the proposed law so that dormitories would be 35 feet, which, as was pointed out by Ms. Ulman and Mr. Marshall, is what other buildings are in the Village.

In fact, Mr. Marshall said at the beginning of the meeting, he said, "It has to be the same as every other building in the Village. If every other building is limited to 35 feet, you can't say that this should be 25 feet because I don't like it. You can't do that because the courts will rule against you." That's how he started the meeting.

After he heard all these statements and all the people saying make it in our favor, make it 15 feet, make it better for us, we're concerned about paying the expenses of someone else's lifestyle, we don't want to make it easy for these people to live here, he said that he rejected the 35-foot limitation based on the comments from the citizenry who attended.

So, he started the meeting saying what's required of us legally is to treat everyone the same; then he listened to

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were not about size.

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1 the comments and he said based on what you've said, I'm not 2 doing that. 3 They weren't interested in following the law. 4 were interested in making the changes and keeping the laws that 5 the people wanted, making sure that there was no influx of 6 Hasidic and Orthodox Jews into the Village of Pomona as it 7 happened in surrounding towns and villages. 8 But Mr. Marshall wasn't the only one who said 9 something. Mr. Sanderson specifically said, "Based on the 10 input from this evening, I think it's very clear that there is a great deal of concern about changing it from 25 feet to 11 12 35 feet," and he voted to leave the laws as they had been 1.3 proposed before that. 14 Another issue --15 THE COURT: So, when Mr. Storzer said there was 16 disagreement about the most important fact, you're a champion 17 for this fact. 18 MS. SOBEL: I'm a champion for lots of facts, your 19 Honor. 20 I figured you would say that. THE COURT: 21 But I do think it is important because it MS. SOBEL: 2.2. was pointed out that there was no connection, and the connection is there. The statements were made. The statements 23

Along those lines, defendants' counsel is trying to

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portray this as these are outliers. They're not outliers. These are lots and lots of statements. And as Mr. Storzer pointed out, even if this didn't show ill-will, it's still intentional discrimination. If you're concerned about the tax base, if you're concerned about the political power, and these are things that you're associating with Hasidic and Orthodox Jews, it's intentional discrimination, and Mr. Storzer cited the cases. And I'll direct your Honor to our pretrial brief which has those cases on page 27, which really points out how that plays into it.

And Mr. Marshall is the one who said it was a hostile meeting. We're not calling it hostile; he called it hostile.

And then another statement was made implying that

Mr. Marshall could not possibly be making anti-Semitic or

anti-Orthodox or anti-Hasidic statements because he is Jewish.

And, unfortunately, that's simply is not true. There's no card

that says just because you share a faith with someone, that

you're not making decisions to keep them out, especially when

we're talking about different denominations of the same

religion. It's not a free pass to say, Well, I couldn't

possibly be because I am -- because I'm of the same religion.

It's a different denomination.

And Mr. Cook also made it clear that he was Jewish, but he made it clear how he felt about the Orthodox and the Hasidic, and he did not see himself as one of them. So, we

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1 | just want to point out that distinction.

THE COURT: You know, there have been studies done about discrimination in urban areas in terms of picking up passengers by taxi drivers. And it turns out the discrimination by the taxi driver doesn't necessarily depend on the race of the driver.

MS. SOBEL: I understand.

And the next thing that we would like to say is the defendants' counsel said that there were no anti-Hasidic or Orthodox statements during the time frame that the laws were discussed, but how do we know that?

First of all, every time -- we don't agree with that based on everything we've heard from the meetings that were public, but let's be clear: They met ten times from July 2006 until December 2006. Before they knew anything about the size of the project, they met ten times about Tartikov in executive session against the New York Public Open Meetings Law, which prohibits you from meeting about something in executive session. There was no pending litigation. There was nothing that they could be meeting about. So, we don't know. We don't know what was said in those meetings. We can infer, but we don't know.

At the end of those -- during the time frame of those ten secret unauthorized meetings, two of the four challenged laws, which prohibit plaintiffs from having their rabbinical

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college, were introduced.

And then my last point is, defendants' counsel said that — they talked about the fact that plaintiffs are segregating themselves and they seem to have a problem with that, but, again, you can't keep people out or make laws against them because they're segregating themselves, but then say said, Well, it's a monastery. But here's the thing: A monastery would be permitted in Pomona because the residents of a monastery are prohibited from being married or having families. So, specifically Orthodox and Hasidic Jews, who are required to be married and have families, they're the ones who can't have a religious training institution that they can live at. They can't have a monastery for Orthodox and Hasidic Jews under Pomona's laws, but other religions, they can have theirs.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MS. HAMILTON: Okay. So, we're definitely living in two universes on two sides of the room.

What strikes me most about what we just heard is that there seems to have been a fundamental inability to remember this a facial challenge.

As your Honor knows, we strongly disagree with the interpretation of this Court on what amounts to a facial challenge, and we have every intention of taking that up in the Second Circuit.

Case 7:07-cv-06304-KMK Document 355 Filed 03/05/18 Page 71 of 94 71 170907congreOA Argument THE COURT: What do you mean? I thought you were 1 2 going to win. You're going to go to the Second Circuit? 3 MS. HAMILTON: Tell me which side's not appealing. 4 They're appealing. 5 A facial challenge, your Honor, requires them to prove 6 that it's supposed to be unconstitutional in every 7 circumstance. They haven't been able to show it's unconstitutional in one, except by making things up. 8 9 At least we had some honesty at the end. They don't know what happened in executive session; that's true. 10 11 no evidence in the record about the executive sessions. 12 1.3 THE COURT: Do you dispute that the executive sessions 14 were contrary to state law? 15 MS. HAMILTON: We don't agree that they were contrary 16 to state law. 17 THE COURT: Okay. And why is that? 18 MS. HAMILTON: Because executive sessions are 19 permissible for purposes of discussing either litigation or 20 other matters in preparation. 21 THE COURT: But there was no litigation when these

THE COURT: But there was no litigation when these sessions happened.

MS. HAMILTON: With them.

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THE COURT: Was there any litigation at all regarding Tartikov back then?

Argument

1 MS. HAMILTON: What was listed as one of the many 2 topics in each session --3 THE COURT: Right, but was there any litigation 4 involving Tartikov back in '06? 5 MS. HAMILTON: There was no -- well, there was a 6 threat of litigation. 7 THE COURT: But there was no litigation. And the threat of litigation, what makes you say that? 8 9 What was the threat of litigation? 10 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, if I can just read what happens in executive session by state law --11 12 THE COURT: Yes. 1.3 MS. HAMILTON: -- because it would be unfortunate to 14 have a federal Court imply that executive sessions are illegal 15 when they're not. 16 Section 105 says that executive sessions involve 17 matters which will imperil the public safety if disclosed; any 18 matter which may disclose the identity of a law enforcement 19 agent or informer; information relating to current or future 20 investigation or prosecution; discussions regarding proposed, 21 pending or current litigation; collective negotiations pursuant 2.2. to Article Fourteen of the Civil Service Law; medical, 23 financial, credit or employment histories of a particular 24 person or corporation; preparation, grading or administration of examinations; proposed acquisition, sale or lease of real 25

Argument

1 property. So, --

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THE COURT: Hang on. So, which one of those do you think applies?

MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, --

THE COURT: You just listed them all off. So, public safety, former investigation, prosecution, medical, financial history, examination.

I mean, are you going for the litigation exception?

MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, the executive sessions are not open to the public for purposes of these kinds of considerations.

THE COURT: I understand that. Which one of those considerations could have possibly applied to any conversation about Tartikov?

MS. HAMILTON: Tartikov was not necessarily discussed. It was on the list. Just because it's on the list, doesn't mean it was discussed. In fact, it wasn't Tartikov --

THE COURT: It would be really unfortunate -- to use your paradigm, it would be really unfortunate if the defendants asserted that the executive sessions were legal and in fact there was no basis for that assertion.

So, I want to know what the basis is for you to say that the executive sessions were not contrary to Section 105, which you just listed the things that could justify such a session, and I don't see how any of those would apply.

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     170907congreOA
                                 Argument
 1
              MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, there was a list of topics
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     for each executive session. Camp Dora --
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              THE COURT: Okay. Let's -- do we have the agenda for
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     these executive sessions? Let's go through them.
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              MS. SOBEL: We just need a minute to pull them.
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              (Pause)
 7
              MR. PELOSO: Is your Honor looking for the exhibits or
 8
     the testimony?
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              THE COURT: Let's just find out the executive sessions
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     where Tartikov is listed as being on the agenda.
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              MR. SAVAD: She's getting it.
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              MS. SOBEL: We have July 24, Exhibit 92.
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              MR. PELOSO: I would ask, is that Camp Dora or
14
     Tartikov?
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              MS. SOBEL: The testimony said that they called it
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     Camp Dora. The testimony said that when they said Camp Dora,
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     they meant whoever owned the property.
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              The first one is July 10, that's Exhibit 120. The
     second one --
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20
              MS. HAMILTON: Excuse me. That's one of a list,
21
     right? Can you read the list of topics?
22
              MS. SOBEL: Your Honor, you asked for the exhibit
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July 10, item 7 says executive session, and then the two items SABRINA A. D'EMIDIO - OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

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THE COURT: All right. So, July 10, start with that.

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numbers?

Argument

on there are Ramapo hydrants and Camp Dora, which is --1 2 MR. SAVAD: Which is this one. 3 THE COURT: Tartikov, the property. 4 MS. SOBEL: Yes. 5 THE COURT: Right, because that's what it used to be. 6 So, Ramapo hydrants, do we have any idea what that is? 7 (No response) 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, what we do know is that 10 just because something is on the list does not mean it gets 11 discussed. They do not go through everything on the list. 12 THE COURT: Fair enough, but there's only two items 13 here on the list, number one; and number two, there are ten 14 instances where Camp Dora is on the list. 15 I guess I'm trying to understand, of the things under 16 105 that would justify an executive session, Ramapo hydrants? 17 I don't know how that could possibly fit under any exception 18 that would justify executive session, and I don't know what about Camp Dora could be, either. 19 20 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, nobody in this room knows 21 what was going on with the Ramapo hydrants, whether it affected 2.2. public safety or not, which is the number one thing --23 THE COURT: So, how do we know that the executive 24 sessions were legal, lawful under state law? How do we know 25 that?

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170907congreOA
                                 Argument
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              MS. HAMILTON: Well, we also don't know that they were
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     illegal.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MS. HAMILTON: What I'm saying is that the attempt to
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     cast out and discrimination on local government through
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     innuendo is all they have on this.
 7
              So, to go back to what this case -- Ramapo hydrants
 8
     involved litigation.
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: That's argument and facts.
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     no facts on that. I know you're inquiring and counsel is
11
     trying to answer that --
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              MR. PELOSO: The judge asked the question.
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: I understand.
14
              THE COURT: That's fine.
15
              MR. STEPANOVICH: I'm just making a point.
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              THE COURT: And I think Ms. Ulman is the one that
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     provided the information.
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              MR. PELOSO: Correct.
19
              THE COURT: I get it. I understand.
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              What's in the record --
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              MR. STEPANOVICH: -- is in the record.
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              THE COURT: I totally understand that. Because it's
23
     interesting, Executive Session 16 in Exhibit 92 lists Ramapo
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     lawsuits as one item, Camp Dora as another item, and then
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     hydrants, but here's the thing: If the argument is, Oh, well,
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Argument

1	there were three things on the agenda for executive session and
2	one of those should have been under executive session per
3	Section 105, that doesn't mean the others should have, too.
4	So, to the extent Camp Dora is even on the executive
5	session list, why? What 105 exception would justify that?
6	MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, since we're going outside
7	the record here
8	THE COURT: No. I'm curious.
9	MS. HAMILTON: Well, I'm going to explain it.
10	THE COURT: Okay.
11	MS. HAMILTON: The very first thing that happened in
12	this case before it was ever a case is that Roman Storzer
13	published an op-ed saying that everybody who opposed the
14	process was anti-Semitic. I then wrote a column in response to
15	that. That was very early on.
16	THE COURT: It's on now.
17	MS. HAMILTON: There was already a fight.
18	THE COURT: It is on now.
19	When was that?
20	MS. HAMILTON: There was already a fight going on.
21	MR. STORZER: I can't recall, your Honor, honestly. I
22	can probably find out.
23	THE COURT: Let's find out.
24	MS. HAMILTON: You can find it, and you can read mine
25	on response.

25

Argument

1 THE COURT: Let's find out. See what you can find 2 out. 3 Go ahead. 4 MS. HAMILTON: So, there was no question that there 5 was already an attempt when Roman Storzer enters the venue. 6 THE COURT: By the way, you got Mr. Storzer to blush, 7 which is probably not easy. 8 MS. HAMILTON: So, I'd like to go back to the big 9 picture in this case, because I think that it's helpful in 10 understanding where this case stands in the pantheon of RLUIPA 11 cases which Roman and I have litigated. 12 The Bensalem Pennsylvania case just settled, and the 1.3 Bensalem Pennsylvania case involved a mosque. I represented 14 Bensalem; Roman represented the mosque. 15 THE COURT: I could have figured that one out. 16 MS. HAMILTON: I know. 17 The problem in that case was that the applicant argued 18 that they didn't have to abide by the variance standard because 19 This is an increasing problem in these cases in of RLUIPA. 20 which the argument is that none of the law applies to you, you 21 don't have to do everything that's required by the law, and all 2.2. you need to say is RLUIPA. That is so far from where RLUIPA 23 started. 24 I testified on RLUIPA. It was not intended to

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displace the system. And so, this case, in my view, gets the

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170907congreOA Argument attention it gets because it is the largest piece of property, the largest idea for which there was absolutely no application and no attempt. That's what's problematic about this. THE COURT: Right, but that's why the case is in the posture it's in, right? So, I granted your motion to dismiss the as-applied challenges because I agreed with you. And for all I know, the plaintiffs' counsel is just as angry with me as you are about my view about the standard of review on facial challenges, but we're here today because I agreed with you on that point. So, I understand the argument, and I understand how it feeds into your view about the standard that should be used to evaluate facial challenges. And, look, I'm not stubborn. I have many limitations, but if I'm wrong, I'm wrong, and I will admit it. So, I'm going to look at this very carefully. MS. HAMILTON: Thank you.

THE COURT: So, I understand your arguments in that regard, but just so you know, I can't keep up with RLUIPA cases in Pennsylvania.

MS. HAMILTON: I'm with you. None of us can.

THE COURT: If we can just get back to this one, that would be great.

MS. HAMILTON: What bothers me most and worries me most about this case is no application whatsoever.

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Argument

THE COURT: Each of you has firmly planted your foot on the parade of horribles --

MS. HAMILTON: Here we are.

I would remind the Court about Airmont in which the Court said that RLUIPA does not create an exception for applications for text amendments, zone changes, and area variances. So, that's part of the law. It doesn't create exceptions.

Mr. Storzer actually misstated what I was saying about multi-family housing and misstated the record. What I was saying about multi-family housing is that the plaintiffs did not prove that their religious belief requires multi-family housing.

To the contrary, their own witnesses stated that multi-family housing is not a religious requirement; that the type of house is irrelevant. That's their witnesses. There is nothing in the transcript that shows that they have a belief in the need for either living in dormitories or multi-family housing. And, as I said before, that takes a lot of the wind out of their sails, because the one thing that is so different from the zone that they bought is multi-family versus single-family, but there's no belief in a requirement -- not that it's necessary, there's just no belief in the type of housing they live in. What they want to do is live close. They have 100 acres. They will live close, regardless of the

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Argument

type of building they're living in. 1 2 THE COURT: Right. You know, what do you do with the 3 case law about it being it's not a question of necessity, it's 4 a question of whether it's a sincerely-held belief, and it even 5 includes aspirational notions of what those beliefs are? 6 So, to the extent that there is testimony, both from 7 Tartikov's perspective and the perspective of the would-be 8 students, that the Torah Community is the aspirational notion 9 that it's the combination of the religious obligation to be 10 married and have a family, and then -- because there's no 11 obligation to go to a rabbinical college, so, that's not really 12 the point. The point is, if you're going to attend a 1.3 rabbinical college, it's the sincerely-held belief of both the 14 institution that's going to run it and the students that the 15 Torah community is the best way to achieve that. 16 MS. HAMILTON: Exactly. 17 THE COURT: Right? 18 MS. HAMILTON: They say that they don't believe that a 19 Torah community has to be multi-family housing. 20 THE COURT: But that's the language of necessity. 21 That's not the language of aspiration. 2.2. MS. HAMILTON: No. It's no belief. If there's no 23 religious belief, then RLUIPA and the First Amendment are not 24 triggered.

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THE COURT: It's that they don't believe it's

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2.2.

Argument

1 | necessary. It doesn't mean --

MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, a single-family house is perfectly consistent with their beliefs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HAMILTON: They themselves -- this is their own quote.

THE COURT: Let's assume for the sake of argument that you win that, you still -- for example, if the accreditation law is invalid, you don't even get to the housing question because they can't even build the college.

MS. HAMILTON: As I said before, and I completely disagree with the timeline, the accreditation law was passed before the Village had knowledge of the purchase of the changeover. The accreditation law was passed in response to the belief that YSV owned it and it was going to be an ordinary religious school that would obviously be accredited.

The accreditation requirement was not passed in terms of the timeline in response to knowing anything about Tartikov. But even setting that aside, what if they did know there was going to be a rabbinical college? They had not yet explained that this was going to be the most unusual rabbinical college in the world. There's no other rabbinical college like it. That's why they can't get any kind of accreditation under ordinary circumstances.

Now, they could set up an accreditation system and

Argument

actually get it accredited if they wanted to. 1 2 THE COURT: Well, in order to be accredited, they have 3 to exist, and they can't exist if they can't get it accredited. 4 I know what you're going to say because I read the 5 line in your brief that is suspiciously missing a cite, which 6 is, Oh, people get provisional accreditation all the time. 7 There's nothing in the record about that. 8 MS. HAMILTON: It's called a use variance. 9 THE COURT: No, no, no --10 MS. HAMILTON: Not a use variance. A text amendment. 11 All they had to do was to come in and ask. 12 THE COURT: Ask what? Ask to change the law? 13 MS. HAMILTON: Right. 14 THE COURT: Okay. So, if Congress passed a law 15 tomorrow saying it is a crime to employ Greek Americans, no big 16 deal. Greek Americans just go ask Congress to change the law. 17 If the law is invalid, it's invalid. Your out is, 18 Well, no, they can ask us to change it. 19 MS. HAMILTON: Your Honor, no one had ever imagined a 20 rabbinical college like this, least of all any local government 21 in the State of New York. 22 It can't be the obligation of a local government to 23 imagine what they do not know when they pass an ordinance. 24 They did not know about Tartikov at the time, but even if they 25 had, they did not know of the special qualities that this

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Argument

1 | rabbinical college would have.

THE COURT: The accreditation department does evolve over time, but that's a different argument than text amendment. Text amendment, I'm surprised you keep beating that drum. I just don't really see how that helps.

MS. HAMILTON: Because it's land-use. That's the way land-use operates.

THE COURT: So, what if it's land-use? The law doesn't allow them to even seek a variance, so all you're saying is what they can do is ask them to change the law.

That's what your argument is. And if that's the argument, then there really can't be any way for a court to strike down any unconstitutional law because. Shame on the plaintiffs for not asking the people who they say passed the bad law, to ask them, please, can you change it.

MS. HAMILTON: Airmont actually says the opposite. It says text amendments are part of the exceptions that can be and should be asked for under RLUIPA.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HAMILTON: And that is exactly the process that Congress was imagining; that people would go through ordinary development practices, and there wouldn't be special reasons why you didn't have to do what a secular applicant would have to do; except, if you didn't win, if you didn't get what you asked for, then you got a special privilege under RLUIPA. It's

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Argument

not that you get to leapfrog the process. And that's exactly what saying -- applying for a text amendment is obviously not acceptable, that's what that means.

Before 2001, there were no dorms. They weren't permitted. State law required them to pass a law to permit dorms. In 2001, they expanded dorm use. They didn't reduce it. And the suggestion that having school regulations means that obviously Pomona wants intense use is nonsensical. Schools are permitted. In other jurisdictions, they're permitted, they're expected; it's just, there weren't any at the time. YSV comes in and they pass laws that make YSV very possible. YSV walks away. That's what's in the record.

THE COURT: And there's also some testimony as to why YSV walks away. I know your view as to why YSV walks away, but there is testimony on that.

MS. HAMILTON: There are facts that show that they walked away from the process and entered into the deal with Tartikov.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HAMILTON: Finally, I want to reemphasize that it would be very unfair to say that the Village had to regulate and include a use that was inconceivable. This is a facial challenge, and so the remedy, if any of the laws were to be stricken, is to remove the law; that's the whole remedy. And that would mean they would have to apply it, and then we can go

Argument

back to where we should have been from the beginning. 1 2 Finally, there's a real problem with respect to the 3 narrowing of this case on particular facts having to do with 4 just this particular non-applicant. The laws that are at stake 5 here are in other communities, as the record shows. 6 holding these laws facially illegal or unconstitutional will 7 have effects well beyond Pomona. 8 Thank you. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. 10 MR. STORZER: A few points. 11 MR. STEPANOVICH: I yield my time. As much as I'd 12 like to respond, I yield my time to my colleagues. 13 THE COURT: Fair enough. 14 MS. SOBEL: I just want to talk about one thing, and then Mr. Storzer can follow. 15 16 Your Honor, I just want to talk a little bit more 17 about the executive sessions, because I think there were some 18 things that were said that are not correct. 19 The Executive Session Law, New York Public Officers 20 Official Law 105 says that "In an open meeting, pursuant to a 21 motion identifying the general area or areas of the subject or 2.2. subjects to be considered..." 23 So, to be clear, during the regular meeting, they had 24 to say which reason they were going for. They can't now say 25 which one they think it is. And in two of the minutes, which

Argument

we have in the record for the regular meeting, Exhibit 105, which is from December 18, 2006, it says that they adjourned to executive session to discuss matters of litigation.

On 11/27/06, Exhibit 115, which is in the record, it was produced by defendants but without the last page, so we don't know what reason was stated, but on 9/25/06, which is Exhibit 121, on page 6, it says, Adjourned to executive session to discuss matter of litigation. So, the only one that they were going for was litigation.

And to say that, well, there was litigation that was threatened then -- we can't find when the exchange happened between Mr. Storzer and Ms. Hamilton, but to be clear, during the spoliation motion in this case, we said in our brief that defendants should have had knowledge of the litigation in December 2006, and that's at docket 196, page 6, that was our motion of law in support of our spoliation sanctions. They directly denied this.

In docket 200, page 4, they cite to the January 2007 dissemination of Tartikov's plans as when they became aware for the potential for a dispute in the future.

Similarly, at docket 200, pages 4-5, they said,
Village trustees never discussed litigation in January 2007.

And in the Village representative Attorney Doris Ulman's affidavit, docket 203, paragraph 16, she said that around the time that the plans were leaked to the media in

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Argument

January 2007, she sensed the possibility that the Village might have a dispute with Tartikov in the future and that she does not know of any individual defendants who discussed the topic in January of 2007.

So, defendants have taken the position to this Court that there was no threat of litigation prior to January of 2007. And so, there's no question that when they were having the discussions ten times between July and December of 2006, there was no litigation.

They also can't use the attorney/client privilege as both a sword and a shield. They cannot say trust us, we didn't say anything discriminatory during those meetings, but we can't tell you what happened during those meetings because attorney/client privilege. If you're relying on what you said in those meetings, you have to say what you said. You can't just say that we should trust you. It's not a sword and a shield.

It's their privilege. They could have waived it.

They did not put in any evidence to say anything about what happened in those meetings, and they can't be allowed to put in conjecture today.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PELOSO: One moment, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PELOSO: Just one comment. Two seconds.

Argument

Counsel was just saying that we use the sword-and-the-shield argument, that I mentioned that Ms. Ulman in her affidavit testified that in none of the meetings or the laws did she ever hear any discriminatory comments being made. I'd just like to point out that those meetings did not occur in executive session. Those meetings occurred outside of executive session, so it's not a sword and a shield. We're not hiding behind anything.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. STORZER: A few final points.

THE COURT: Sure, and then I have one final question, which I'll let you-all decide who answers it for the plaintiff.

Go ahead.

MR. STORZER: Ms. Hamilton, again, describes the use as inconceivable. This is the use that they sued the Town of Ramapo for, authorized the lawsuit against Ramapo just a few months prior obviously was not inconceivable; it was well in their minds.

Ms. Hamilton also raised the issue of multi-family housing not being specifically required for the students' religious beliefs. And, again, putting aside the necessity question, this is not about multi-family housing. That's one specific type of housing use.

All family housing is prohibited as part of an educational institution in the Village of Pomona. You can't

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Argument

have single-family homes, you can't have townhouses, you can't have duplexes, you can't have apartment buildings. You can't have any type of housing that houses families on an educational institution campus. The multi-family housing which translates to apartment buildings is just a red herring.

With respect to the facial challenge issue, again, I think Planned Parenthood v. Casey answers that question completely. Did the Village's position here, if argued in that case, would simply be, well, why don't those wives tell their husbands, then there would be no problem. It's not a good response, not in the First Amendment constitutional rights-type case. It is the class for which the regulation creates the problem that is at issue, and not for colleges that are accredited, not for colleges that only need dormitories for single students, and so on.

And the final point, the Bensalem matter was mentioned. I recommend the Court reading the decision in Bensalem Masjid v. Bensalem Township where the Court held that plaintiffs there did not need to apply for a use variance in order to proceed with the lawsuit on an as-applied and facial challenge.

If the Court has questions, perhaps I should -THE COURT: Ms. Hamilton raised something that
triggered a question. She said that -- you know, she was sort
of suggesting that if the relief that you're seeking is, since

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Argument

we're in a posture only on facial challenge, the relief you 1 2 would get would be invalidation of the law. 3 Is there anything else you think you'd be entitled to? 4 MR. STORZER: We're asking the Court to appoint a 5 monitor to oversee an application process. We think leaving 6 the henhouse in the charge of the foxes here is not a good 7 idea. And, certainly, we heard what the Village will do. 8 will delay us for years and years through the SEQRA process. 9 THE COURT: I guess, I'm not sure. What would a 10 monitor do? Say hurry up? 11 MR. STORZER: In essence, they can oversee the 12 process. It is a complicated process. There are various 13 things, procedural aspects that have to happen in this kind of 14 application. We'd have to apply for a special permit. We'd 15 have to apply for cite plan approval. We'd have to do SEQRA 16 There are questions as to who becomes the lead agency 17 there, which body would it be, and under New York law, that can 18 be various types of bodies that can constitute the lead agency. 19 THE COURT: So, we would have a federal monitor tell a 20 municipality how to apply its own land-use procedures? 21 MR. STORZER: These are land-use procedures that are 2.2. generally governed by state law. 23 THE COURT: Exactly. MR. STORZER: Where the plaintiffs have proved 24

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intentional discrimination, if the plaintiffs prove that, then

2.2.

	170907congreOA Argument
1	I think it's clearly warranted here. It's garden-variety
2	stuff. Absent the discriminatory aspect of this, our setbacks
3	match, is the storm water management plan capable of being
4	approved and so on? At the very least, there are time frames
5	that can be set so this does not drag out, as a Village trustee
6	said, for four or five years until they save enough to fight
7	another RLUIPA lawsuit at the end of it.
8	THE COURT: Anything else that you were contemplating?
9	MR. STEPANOVICH: I think that will conclude our
10	presentation.
11	MS. HAMILTON: One word in response to Mr. Storzer's
12	suggestion of a monitor. Federalism. And we have written
13	about it throughout the case, so I'm not going to belabor.
14	THE COURT: I figured that's what you were going to

say, and that's why I figured I was going to ask the question you would want asked.

MS. HAMILTON: Thank you.

MR. STEPANOVICH: Mr. Savad.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SAVAD: If I may say something.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SAVAD: I've had situations where monitors have been appointed by the federal court. There was a project just down the road from this, there was a substantial housing development. An attorney was appointed as the monitor. And

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for a monitor.

Argument

ultimately, I asked for a hearing before the court and the monitor recommended sanctions against the Town of Haverstraw in which this village is partially located. And that resulted -that application for sanction resulted in the judge saying this case ought to be settled; otherwise, you're going to be paying Mr. Savad's legal fees. We went outside and we settled the case. The monitor was very important in that case, and the Court took note of it, and it resulted in a settlement. The monitor shows up, he senses the crowd, he senses the people, and, if necessary, we make application to the Court. Thanks. THE COURT: That's quite a powerful person, senses the crowd. MR. SAVAD: No, but the judge has the ultimate decision. THE COURT: I know, but that's quite a skill set. MR. SAVAD: Yes. THE COURT: Or the monitor could be a way to keep you all coming back here every week, not that I don't love each and every one of you. MR. SAVAD: I don't think the Village would want to come back at that point. THE COURT: Depends. Maybe they'd be the ones asking

170907congreOA Argument MR. SAVAD: We enjoyed ourselves. 1 2 THE COURT: Anything? 3 MR. STEPANOVICH: Nothing further on behalf of 4 plaintiffs, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Anything else? 6 MS. HAMILTON: Nothing further. 7 THE COURT: I have to say, I wasn't the least bit 8 surprised of the quality of the briefing here, given the 9 quality of the advocacy up to this point, but truly, it is a lot of material to marshal. And I thought you all did a heck 10 of a job. 11 12 So, you can imagine, you write a lot of briefs, we 1.3 read a lot of briefs, and this was really excellent advocacy by 14 all of you. I really appreciate it. I wish you litigated more cases in front of us because it would make life a lot easier. 15 16 I will do my best. I promise you, this won't be 17 delayed very long. I'm working really hard on this. I'll give 18 you an answer as soon as I can. 19 With that, I will bid you a pleasant afternoon. 20 21 Certified to be a true and correct 2.2. transcript of the stenographic record 23 to the best of my ability. Jabrina A. Vemidio 24 U.S. District Court

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